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INTRODUCTION

Professor Anderson argues that so long as insider trading is consented to by all market participants, it is hard to find a strong moral
objection to it.1 I agree that explaining why we prohibit consensual
transactions is always a tall order.2 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the
law outlaws a remarkable number of mutually beneficial arrangements
that all participants have agreed to.3 Issuer-licensed insider trading is
just one of these. Should the law ban it? Professor Anderson is unconvinced by an argument I have given elsewhere to explain why the law
should ban it.4 Here, I will try to restate that argument in what I hope is
a more congenial way.
Many years ago, Amartya Sen proved a famous theorem in the theory of social choice,5 closely related to Kenneth Arrow’s famous
impossibility result.6 It holds that there is a deep incompatibility
between rules that create rights and the Pareto principle.7 The theorem’s
significance for the law has gone surprisingly unappreciated. My argument about insider trading is really just an application of Sen’s theorem
* Frank Carano Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See John P. Anderson, What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 795 (2015) [hereinafter Anderson, What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider
Trading?]; John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From Trading
Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 384–85 (2015).
2. See LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 18 (2011) (“There are many . . . cases
where we strongly feel that consent should not count but that cannot be explained on the grounds
of coercion, deception, incompetence, or effects on innocent third parties . . . .”).
3. See id. at 15–18 (2011). The first chapter of this book is titled “Things We Can’t Consent
To, Though No One Knows Why,” and discusses several examples where consent is irrelevant to
the law.
4. See Anderson, What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider Trading?, supra note 1, at
795.
5. See AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 80 (1970).
6. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POLT.
ECON. 328 (1950).
7. SEN, supra note 5, at 79–81.
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to a specific context. In this response, I will illustrate Sen’s argument
with a very specific example. I will then show how that example
explains why assumption of risk arguments so often fail in law. I will
conclude by pointing out that allowing someone to consent to be at the
other end of issuer-licensed insider trading is to let him assume a risk
under circumstances that pose a Sen-type problem. I will avail myself of
examples I have used in Why the Law Is So Perverse to discuss related
problems.8
II.

SEN’S THEOREM ILLUSTRATED9

A man and his wife, Al and Chloe, are brought to an emergency
room with injuries they have suffered in a car accident. Al’s injuries are
the most severe: if he does not immediately receive treatment, he will
probably lose the use of both of his legs. Chloe’s injuries are much less
severe: only some banging up of her hand, which might lead to a slight
impairment of manual dexterity if she does not receive immediate medical attention. Alas, there is only one doctor on duty, and needless to say,
he immediately directs his attention toward Al. Chloe however is
extremely worried about her hand. She is a passionate hobby pianist and
being able to play the piano well means everything to her. Moreover, Al
is totally besotted with Chloe and is so supremely concerned about her
welfare that he asks the doctor to attend to Chloe’s needs first. The doctor balks at first, but when Al absolutely refuses to let himself be treated
until Chloe has been taken care of, he has no choice but to relent.
As the doctor is about to treat Chloe, a third patient is wheeled into
the ER, Bea, who has also been in a car accident, but whose injuries are
intermediate between those of Al and Chloe. If she is not immediately
attended to, she stands to lose the use of one of her legs—less serious
than Al’s threatened loss of both legs, but more serious than Chloe’s loss
of some manual dexterity. What should the doctor do? He is clearly in a
quandary. If he continues to treat Chloe, Bea will protest that surely she
has a stronger claim to his help than Chloe, since a one-leg injury is a
more serious matter than Chloe’s hand injury. But if he acquiesces to
Bea’s protest, Al will object that he surely has a stronger claim to being
treated than Bea. And if the doctor thereupon redirects his efforts to Al,
Al will then proceed to tell him that frankly he would prefer if Chloe got
treated rather than he, and that he should not worry himself too much
about Bea, because Bea is not going to get treated no matter what: if the
8. KATZ, supra note 2.
9. The following hypothetical illustration involving “Al,” “Chloe,” and “Bea” comes from
my book, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE. See id. at 25–27.
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doctor should continue to refuse to treat Chloe, he, Al, will insist on his
priority.
What we have here is a curious cycle, arising from the fact that
when the doctor decides on the relative priority of Chloe and Bea, a
rights-based argument tells him he should give Bea priority.10 When he
decides on the relative priority of Bea and Al, a rights-based argument
tells him he should give priority to Al.11 But when he decides between
the relative priority of Al and Chloe, the Pareto principle tells him he
should choose Chloe (Al and Chloe benefit and Bea is unaffected).12
This is the essence of Sen’s claim about the incompatibility between
rights and the Pareto principle.13
Some people have so internalized the Pareto principle and its legal
counterpart, freedom of contract,14 that it will seem obvious that the
Pareto principle should prevail over the rights-based claims, thus implying that the doctor should choose Chloe.15 But that view has many
implications that would appear highly counterintuitive.16 To be sure,
there are also many counterintuitive implications that flow from
rejecting the Pareto principle.17 The point, however, is that one can go
either way in this example. It is no less plausible in this context to reject,
as it is to endorse, freedom of contract. To get a sense of what makes it
so counterintuitive to allow Al to alienate his priority over Bea to Chloe,
consider the following situation. Imagine a friend were to ask you for
some money to help with a medical treatment that he needs. Suppose
you feel strongly inclined to help him, because you feel that his longstanding friendship with you gives him a strong claim upon you. Imag10. See id. at 28.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 27–28.
13. See SEN, supra note 5, at 78–86.
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 7 (1993) (“[I]f
two parties are to be observed entering into a voluntary private exchange, the presumption must be
that both feel the exchange is likely to make them better off, otherwise they would not have
entered into it. Thus, in most exchanges, the economic presumption is that they make all the
parties thereto better off, that is, they are Pareto superior.”).
15. See Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden Limitations of Consent, 104
MICH. L. REV. 627, 665 (2006) (“It seems hard to resist the idea that someone has more of a claim
to not being harmed than to receiving affirmative help in some calamity.”).
16. For example: “[If] we are to assume that over a lifetime everyone will end up being a
victim as often as he will end up being a tortfeasor . . . we [c]ould say that there should probably
not be any compensation for tortious injuries . . . because everyone will be paying out as much as
he will be taking in, and since the process of litigating such cases . . . will cost money, everyone
would be better off if all injuries are simply allowed to lie where they fall. . . . [T]he fairness
theorist . . . will, of course, insist on compensation in every one of these cases because that is what
he in general would insist on. Yet in this case it squarely puts him into conflict with the Pareto
principle since everyone would be better off if no such compensation were paid.” Id. at 658.
17. See id.
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ine next, however, that he changes his mind. He explains to you that it
would make him far happier to spend the money on a cruise than on
medical treatment. Would you still feel inclined to give the money to
him? No, probably not, or at least not as strongly. That is because his
claim upon you for medical treatment is much greater than his claim
upon you for a cruise. This is true despite the fact that the cruise would
make your friend much happier. And that’s how it is with claims. One
cannot readily exchange one for another, even if it is the Pareto-optimal
thing to do. It is the same with Al. He has a claim upon the doctor. He
would like to exchange the claim he has to get his two-leg injury treated
ahead of Bea’s injury, for another claim, which would be Pareto-optimal, namely to get his wife’s hands treated first. Claims just cannot be
exchanged like that.
III.

SEN’S THEOREM APPLIED

TO THE

ASSUMPTION

OF

RISK CONTEXT

We can use this example to explain why we are so often inclined to
refuse to recognize the validity of assumption of risk arguments.18 Suppose a worker is asked to perform a hazardous task.19 The employer
offers to buy him an expensive type of protective suit. The worker volunteers to do the job without such a suit in exchange for a slightly higher
wage. The wage increase being less than the cost of the suit, the
employer acquiesces. This is the kind of agreement that often gets overturned.20 Why? With the help of the “triage” example above, we can
illuminate the basis for that.21 The relationship between the worker and
the employer can be thought of as analogous to that between Al and
Chloe.22 The worker has a strong claim upon the law to see to it that the
employer subordinates his desire to economize to the worker’s need for
safety. But he is willing to alienate that claim in return for an increase in
his wage. If we look carefully, though, we will be able to find a third
party, who occupies a position analogous to that of Bea, whose presence
renders that kind of a bargain unpalatable. The third parties here are the
members of the public at large with whom the worker is going to inter18. KATZ, supra note 2, at 37–39 (“consider[ing] the innumerable ways in which the law
restricts our ability to assume certain risks”).
19. This example using a worker that will come in contact with hazardous materials is also
taken from WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE. See id. at 22–23.
20. See, e.g., id. at 23 (“The assumption of risk defense is considered problematic. Some
jurisdictions recognize it; others once did but have abolished it . . . .”); id. at 37 (“If the employee
is injured and proceeds to sue the employer for negligence, many jurisdictions will hold the
employer liable for negligence.”).
21. See id. at 37–38.
22. This analogy is also made in WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE. See id. at 37–39.
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act when he is not doing his job.23 All of them are being asked to
observe the standard onerous precautions the law insists on—usually
through the doctrine of negligence—in interacting with him.24 They are
required to see to it that they do not inadvertently or for that matter
advertently injure him while they pursue their own projects.25 But that
puts them in the same position as Bea to object that the sacrifice they are
being asked to make for the worker’s sake is being squandered, as it
were, when he acquiesces in a risk of severe injury, for the sake of a
small increase in his wage.
IV.

THE LESSON

FOR

INSIDER TRADING

The shareholder who buys shares in a company that endorses
insider trading is assuming a risk.26 That assumption of risk is analytically identical to the assumption of risk by the worker, and is problematic for the same reason. Do not misunderstand me. I am not suggesting
that such a consensual transaction absolutely has to be banned in the
assumption of risk case any more than it has to be absolutely banned in
the “triage” case. It is just that in all of these cases there is enough of a
tension between rights-based priorities and those based on the Pareto
principle (and freedom of contract), that it seems perfectly understandable, and quite defensible, that the law should go with rights over Pareto,
as it has done for a long time now in connection with insider trading.27

23. See id. at 39 (“[T]he problem with letting people assume any risk they want to is that they
are simultaneously imposing hefty burdens on others.”).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 173 (1996).
27. See id. at 171–73.
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